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CON CLUSION ....................................................................... 1907
I. INTRODUCTION
Asylum seekers in the United States face broad disparities in the nation's 54 immigration courts, with the outcome of cases influenced by things like the location of the court
and the sex and professional background of judges, a new study has found .... Oftentimes, it's just the luck of the draw," said Cheryl Little, a lawyer and executive director
of the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center, a legal assistance group in Miami that
represents many asylum seekers. "It's heartbreaking," Ms. Little said. "How do you explain to people asking for refuge that even in the United States of America we can't as1
sure them they will receive due process and justice?"

The asylum system is in disarray. The United States is unable
to guarantee that every asylum seeker will receive a fair and impartial hearing. 2 Although media attention recently has focused on the
asylum system's procedural flaws, 3 unjust statutory interpretations
also work against those seeking refuge in the United States. This Note
focuses on one particular example within this commonly criticized
area of the law: the prevailing interpretation of section 101(a)(42) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act 4 to bar those who have persecuted others under duress from attaining refugee status.
It is intuitively appealing that a system of laws should hold
persons accountable only for actions undertaken pursuant to their
own free will and not for coerced actions. This concept is a staple of
criminal law, under which duress serves as an excuse for conduct otherwise considered criminal. 5 Courts have interpreted asylum law,
however, to preclude consideration of this moral precept in determining whether an applicant for asylum has participated or assisted in
6
the persecution of others.
A person seeking asylum in the United States must prove she
satisfies the definition of "refugee" under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which requires that she be unwilling or unable
to return to her home country because of "[past] persecution or a well-

1.
Julia Preston, Wide DisparitiesFound in Judgingof Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2007, at Al.
See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparitiesin Asylum Adjudication, 60
2.
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983946
(suggesting that the results in asylum cases are determined more by who the judge is and where
the court is located than by the facts and law of the case).
3.
See, e.g., Preston, supra note 1.
4.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
5.
KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 559-60 (5th ed. 2004).
6.
See, e.g., Zhang Jian Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not include an implicit voluntariness requirement).
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founded fear of [future] persecution." 7 The INA qualifies this definition
of "refugee," however, to exclude "any person who ordered, incited, as8
sisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person."
This clause bars those considered "unworthy" of obtaining protection
from refugee status. 9 Thus, the United States will not grant an applicant asylum due to the persecution she suffered if she inflicted the
same type of harm upon others. The past persecutory acts taint the
applicant.
The INA does not state explicitly that those who participated in
the persecution of others against their will-who were forced, for example, to inflict harm upon pain of death-should be barred from
seeking asylum, but this is how some courts have interpreted the
Act. 10 This interpretation dates back several decades and rests largely
upon the Supreme Court's interpretation in Fedorenko v. United
States, not of the INA, but of a "similar" provision in the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948 ("DPA"). 11 Despite the notable dissimilarities between the two pieces of legislation,1 2 modern courts have declined to
limit Fedorenko to the context of the DPA, regarding it as precedent in
interpreting the INA as well.' 3 Thus, for many asylum seekers, any
past persecution in which they took part, even if they acted under duress, serves as an absolute bar to refugee status. The United States often deports such applicants to the very countries in which they suffered past persecution or fear future persecution.
This Note proposes that reliance on Fedorenko in the INA context is unfounded and that courts should reinterpret section 101(a)(42)
of the INA to include an implied exception for acts committed under
duress. The fact that an asylum applicant was coerced into committing
7.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Under conventions of immigration law, "refugee" refers to a person applying for protection in the United States from outside its borders, whereas a person seeking asylum from within is an "asylee." DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED
STATES 4 (3d ed. 1999). This Note uses the term "refugee" to echo the language of the INA, even
though most of the applicants mentioned raised claims from within the United States, making
them asylees.
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9.
See ANKER, supra note 7, at 415 (discussing exclusions from refugee status and asylum
under U.S. law).
10. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005); Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d
348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003).
11. 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981); see also Xie, 434 F.3d at 141 (noting the similarity of the two
Acts). See generally Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009,
amended by Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219, and Act of June 28,
1951, Pub. L. No. 82-60, 65 Stat. 96.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 80-91.
13. See, e.g., Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2006); Xu Sheng Gao v.
U. S. Attorney Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915,
927 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Fedorenko as precedent in interpreting § 101(a)(42) of the INA).
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persecution should factor into a court's determination of her status as
a refugee. Such an approach would mirror the function that the affirmative defense of duress serves in the criminal law context. This
Note outlines the proposed scope of such an exception, identifying the
limited circumstances under which coercion should excuse acts of persecution that would otherwise bar a grant of asylum.
Part II of this Note offers background on this issue, examining
the text of section 101(a)(42) of the INA, as well as the scope of the
term "persecution." Part III surveys the development of case law interpreting the statutory bar to refugee status for past persecution of
others and the extent to which the interpretations of appellate courts
diverge. Part IV offers a critique of the current application of section
101(a)(42) of the INA, and Part V proposes the reinterpretation of that
provision to recognize duress as an excuse for past persecution in circumstances where actions truly were coerced.
II. STATUTORY LAW AND "PERSECUTION"
Asylum law is a statutory creation, a right granted by Congress
to foreign nationals who are unable to return to their home countries.
This Part first examines the text of section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which defines the term "refugee." It then
considers the common law development of the term "persecution,"
upon which a grant of asylum is predicated.
A. Section 101(a)(42)
The United States first formally pledged to aid refugees worldwide in 1968, when it became a signatory to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 14 This international document
did not include procedural mechanisms by which signatories could determine refugee status, leaving implementation to each individual
country. 15 From 1968 to 1980, the United States had no systematic
method of granting asylum; it reviewed such claims on an ad hoc basis.16

14. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. II, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T 6223, 606 U.N.T.S 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
15. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:1 (2d ed. 2006).
16. Id.; see, e.g., Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 52 (1971) (resolving the conflict
between the Second and Ninth Circuits regarding the relevancy of resettlement in the consideration of an application for asylum).
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With the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress addressed this gap in
the law. 17 Section 101(a)(42) of the Refugee Act defines "refugee" for
purposes of the preexisting Immigration and Nationality Act as:
[A]ny person who.., is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of [his or her country of origin] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.1

The section continues by qualifying the term "refugee" to exclude "any
person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."1 9 This
latter clause bars individuals who committed persecution from seeking
refugee status. Other sections of the INA echo the language of section
101(a)(42), reiterating that someone who persecuted others cannot be
20
granted asylum or qualify for other refugee benefits.
B. The Scope of "Persecution"
The Immigration and Nationality Act does not contain a definition of persecution, despite the fact that the definition of refugee relies
upon the scope of that term. Instead, the INA lists the grounds upon
which one can allege that persecution has taken place: "on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. ' 21 The absence of a definition within the Act implies
that Congress delegated the determination of which particular acts
rise to the level of persecution to the courts.
Article I and Article III courts generally agree upon the scope
of the term. 22 Circuit courts accept the definition initially put forth by
17. ANKER, supra note 7, at 1.
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
19. Id. The bulk of this Note focuses on situations in which the refugee was "assisting" or
"participating" in the persecution of others, as opposed to "ordering" or "inciting" it. Although all
four types of action are sufficient to bar an applicant under section 101(a)(42), this discussion
focuses on involuntariness, and thus "assisted" and "participated" are the more relevant verbs.
Insofar as the words "ordered" and "incited" imply a greater degree of volition, they are less pertinent to this discussion.
20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (barring those who persecuted others from asylum); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (barring those who persecuted others from withholding
of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(ii) (2007) (shifting the burden of proof to the applicant to rebut allegations of persecution of others).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
22. Asylum law is a branch of administrative law that involves courts in both the executive
and judicial branches. A claim for asylum proceeds first through the Department of Homeland
Security within the executive branch, with the applicant appearing before an immigration judge.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Immigration
Court Process in the United States (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/
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the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"): "a threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ in a
way regarded as offensive." 23 This two-pronged definition reflects the
language of the INA itself, which allows an applicant for asylum to allege either past persecution (requiring a showing of past "infliction of
suffering or harm") or "a well-founded fear of persecution" in the fu24
ture, (requiring a showing of "threat[s] to ... life or freedom").
The harm endured or threatened must be severe to qualify as
grounds for persecution. According to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
"[t]he harm or suffering need not be physical, but may take other
forms, such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage, or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment, or other
essentials of life." 25 However, not every harmful act is persecutory;
acts do not rise to the level of persecution when they consist of only "a
few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation." 26 The
BIA has stated that "persecution [does] not encompass all treatment
that society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional."2 7 The overall context of the applicant's situation must be examined to determine whether she has suffered persecution. 28 Certain
acts are completely excluded from the scope of persecution: acts of selfdefense, 29 acts of normal warfare between nations or civil war within a

05lmmigrationCourtProcess2005.htm. If denied asylum, the applicant can appeal his case to the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), also within the executive branch. Id. Decisions of the BIA
are appealed directly to federal appellate courts. Id. Such courts grant deference to the agency on
questions of fact when supported by substantial evidence, but review questions of law de novo.
E.g., Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 2006).
23. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (emphasis added), modified on other
grounds, In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); see Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961
(9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting the second part of the
definition, that persecution is the "infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ in race,
religion or political opinion in a way regarded as offensive" (emphasis added)); see also Dandan v.
Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2003) (defining persecution as "punishment or the infliction
of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that this country does not recognize as legitimate").
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
25. Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Laipenieks, 18 I. &
N. Dec. 433, 456-57 (B.I.A. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)).
26. Sepulveda v. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
27. In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (B.I.A. 1997).
28. E.g., Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2005).
29. Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[H]olding that acts of true
self-defense qualify as persecution would run afoul of the 'on account of requirement ... [and] be
contrary to the purpose of the statute.").
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nation, 30 and torture and physical pain when such acts are part of a
31
criminal interrogation rather than for persecutory motives.
Those qualifying as persecuted must also meet the so-called
"nexus" requirement: that any harm suffered or threatened must be
"on account of' one of the five statutorily enumerated grounds.3 2 Thus,
for example, an applicant who alleges being threatened by an insurgent group for failure to cooperate with its aims does not qualify as a
persecuted individual unless she can prove that the threats were
premised upon race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
33
social group, or political opinion.
Finally, persecution requires subjective intent to harm. The
BIA has stated that "[a] finding of persecution requires some degree of
intent on the part of the persecutor to produce the harm that the applicant fears in order that the persecutor may overcome a belief or characteristic of the applicant." 34 This subjective component is notably different from the objective component in that the focus is on the
persecutor, not the victim. However, the applicant's (not the persecu35
tor's) belief must form the basis for the persecution.
The common law thus defines persecution with three components: severe harm (the objective component), intent to harm (the subjective component), and harm on account of one of the statutorily protected grounds (the nexus requirement). Predicate to a finding that an
applicant is barred from a grant of asylum because she assisted or
participated in the persecution of others is a finding that the actions
taken by the applicant did in fact constitute persecution. Section IV.B
of this Note will contrast these three requirements with the lesser
standard employed by courts for a finding of persecution of others.

30. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 815 (B.I.A. 1988).
31. See Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 930 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
the burden lay on Miranda Alvarado to show that interrogations involving torture were part of
legitimate criminal prosecutions and that he therefore did not assist in persecution based on political opinion).
32. Handono v. Attorney Gen., 226 F. App'x 237, 238 (3d Cir. 2007).
33. See Sanchez v. Attorney Gen., 392 F.3d 434, 438 (11th Cir. 2004) ("To qualify for withholding of removal based on persecution by a guerilla group on account of a political opinion,
Sanchez must establish that the guerillas persecuted her ... because of her actual or imputed
political opinion. It is not enough to show that she was or will be persecuted... due to her refusal to cooperate with the guerillas." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
34. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 815 (emphasis added) (citing In re Acosta, 19
I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), modified on other grounds, In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(B.I.A. 1987)); see Mohamed v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 999, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005) (accepting the Rodriguez-Majano standard).
35. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (explaining that persecution of Jews by
Nazis is persecution not on account of political opinion, but rather on account of religion or ethnicity).
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III. CASE LAW

All interpretations of the statutory bar to refugee status in section 101(a)(42) of the INA begin with a discussion of Fedorenko v.
United States,36 the seminal Supreme Court decision concerning the
effect of past persecution of others. 37 This Part briefly discusses Fedorenko and examines the Board of Immigration Appeal's application
of Fedorenko to the asylum context. It then surveys circuit courts' divergent interpretations of section 101(a)(42).
A. The Supreme Court's Rejection of an InvoluntarinessException to
the Displaced PersonsAct
In Fedorenko, the Court held that past acts of persecution
against others were proper grounds for exclusion under the DPA, even
when those acts were performed involuntarily. 38 The Court revoked
Fyodor Fedorenko's United States citizenship, initially granted under
the DPA, because he persecuted others as a prison guard at Treblinka. 39 The Court relied upon a section of the Act that excludes anyone who has "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations"
40
from qualifying as a "displaced person."
Although Fedorenko argued that he served as a guard against
his will,41 the Court rejected this argument, refusing to give any
weight to the involuntariness of his actions in determining his status
as a displaced person. 42 Instead, the Court held that the nature of the
36. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
37. See, e.g., Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006); Zhang
Jian Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2006); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir.
2005) (citing Fedorenko to support the proposition that "a distinction must be made between
genuine assistance in persecution and inconsequential association with persecutors"); Hernandez
v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2001).
38. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). The DPA was drafted to respond
not to immigration generally, but particularly to those persons displaced by the Second World
War. Id. at 495.
39. Id. at 518.
40. Id. at 496 n.3 (citing Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, annex I,
pt. II, § 2, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IRO Constitution]). Specifically, the Court divested Fedorenko of his citizenship under the rule that "a
naturalized citizen's failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites for naturalization renders
his certificate of citizenship revocable as 'illegally procured' under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514. The Act uses the term "displaced person" instead of "refugee," but the
meaning is the same. Id. at 495-96. Anyone who meets the definition of "refugee" in the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization of the United Nations (the "IRO Constitution") is
a "displaced person" under the DPA. Id.
41. Id. at 500.
42. Id. at 512.
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acts committed by Fedorenko was dispositive of the question of past
persecution of others. 43 In a footnote (now cited in nearly all asylum
cases considering the voluntariness of past persecutory acts), the
Court stated that:
The solution to the problem perceived by the District Court ...lies, not in 'interpreting'
the Act to include a voluntariness requirement that the statute itself does not impose,
but in focusing on whether particular conduct can be considered assisting in the persecution of civilians. Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of
civilians. On the other hand, there can be no question that a guard... who admitted to
shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within
the statutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians. Other
cases 4may present more difficult line-drawing problems, but we need decide only this
4
case.

With this footnote, the Court created a continuum of action that lower
courts could use to judge the actions of future applicants. Furthermore, the Court forcefully rejected an interpretation of the DPA that
45
would factor in the extent to which an applicant acted under duress.
B. The BIA Increases Fedorenko's Reach
In 1988, the BIA adopted Fedorenko in the context of asylum
cases under the INA. In In re Rodriguez-Majano, the Board cited Fedorenko for the proposition that "[t]he participation or assistance of an
alien in persecution need not be of his own volition to bar him from relief.... It is the objective effect of an alien's actions which is controlling."46 The Board thus accepted the major premise of Fedorenko: consideration of whether an applicant voluntarily persecuted a victim (his
internal, subjective mental state) is immaterial; a court should con47
sider solely the external, objective effect of his actions upon others.
Despite rejecting his claim of involuntariness, the BIA granted Rodriguez-Majano asylum, finding that his actions were not properly labeled as "persecution" because they consisted of normal acts of war48
fare between opposition groups.

43. See id. at 512 n.34 (finding that assistance in persecution via the act of serving as a
paid, armed guard in uniform who shoots at escaping inmates when ordered makes a person ineligible for a visa regardless of whether the conduct was voluntary).
44. Id.
45. See Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2006) (referring to the
"somewhat cryptic footnote" in Fedorenko that courts have since come to view as establishing a
"continuum of conduct" against which the culpability of an individual's actions will be judged).
46. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 814-15 (B.I.A.1988) (emphasis added).
47. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
48. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 815-16.
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C. The Circuit Courts'Interpretations
While circuit courts are not bound by the BIA's decision in
Rodriguez-Majano,49 several have followed that case, applying past
precedent regarding the DPA to cases interpreting the INA. This Section will first review the decisions from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, which have adopted most comprehensively Fedorenko's analysis
of involuntariness in the INA context. The Section continues by examining the Second Circuit's more nuanced decision, which leaves open
the possibility that the court will recognize a duress exception in future cases. It concludes with an examination of the positions of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which agree that voluntariness constitutes
a relevant factor in assessing past persecution of others.
1.Fifth and Seventh Circuits
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits agree that an alien's "personal
motivation" for participating or assisting in persecution is irrelevant
in determining her status under section 101(a)(42) of the INA. The
Fifth Circuit, in Bah v. Ashcroft, held that Amadu Bah was ineligible
for asylum because, as a member of the Revolutionary United Front
("RUF ' ) in Sierra Leone, he murdered civilians. 50 These murders constituted persecution of others based on political opinion. 5 1 The court
rejected Bah's claim that, because he was forced to persecute others
upon pain of death, he did not share the persecutory intent of the
RUF. 5 2 The court, however, declined to phrase its holding in terms of
the involuntariness of Bah's actions, instead finding that "the alien's
personal motivation is not relevant .... Bah participated in persecution, and the persecution occurred because of [the victim]'s political
opinions." 53 The Fifth Circuit found Bah's lack of subjective intent
immaterial; that the objective effect of his actions was persecutory was
enough to bar him from seeking asylum under the INA. The Fifth Circuit did not directly address Bah's claim that he committed the persecutory acts under duress.
The Seventh Circuit, in Singh v. Gonzales, cited Bah for the
proposition that an alien's personal motivation for persecuting others

49. See supra note 22. The BIA's decision in Rodriguez-Majano is based upon the statutory
interpretation of § 101(a)(42) of the INA, and statutory interpretation is a question of law the
circuit courts review de novo. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 815.
50. 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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is not relevant when he assisted or participated in such persecution. 54
The court held that Harpal Singh was barred from refugee status because, as a police officer in India, he aided fellow police officers in the
persecution of Sikhs. 55 Although Singh never tortured anyone, he admitted to bringing Sikh suspects in to the police station, observing the
religiously motivated beatings, and standing guard while others were
beaten. 56 Singh claimed he did not agree with the persecution, and
continued in his job only because of "his need for a steady paycheck
and his apparent desire to avoid searching for work with a different
employer."5 7 The Seventh Circuit found that "just because Singh['s] ...
assistance/participation was premised upon pecuniary concerns does
not change his fate under section 1101(a)(42)" because personal moti58
vation was irrelevant in a finding of past persecution.
2. Second Circuit
More recently, the Second Circuit addressed the involuntariness issue in Zhang Jian Xie v. INS.59 The court agreed that Fedorenko applied to the asylum context and stated its refusal to recognize an "involuntariness exception" to the statutory bar in section
101(a)(42). 60 The court also followed Fedorenko in basing its decision
on the nature of the acts committed: "Where the conduct was active
and had direct consequences for the victims, we concluded that it was
'assistance in persecution.' Where the conduct was tangential to the
acts of oppression and passive in nature, however, we declined to hold
that it amounted to such assistance." 61 In China, Xie worked as a
driver who transported pregnant women to doctors who performed
forced abortion and sterilization procedures. 62 Xie claimed that his
participation was involuntary, but not in the sense of having been
physically coerced into working. 63 The court rejected this characterization, noting that Xie "could have declined at any time to participate in
the persecution of the women by leaving his employment voluntarily."64 His reason for failing to do so appeared to the court to be purely
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 737.
Id.
Id. at 740.

Id.
434 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 140.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 140, 143.
Id. at 143.
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economic. 65 Despite rejecting Xie's claim, the court indicated in dicta
that voluntariness might be relevant in cases where the applicant
claimed to have been "physically or psychologically coerced" into his
persecutory role. 66 Thus, Xie suggests that the Second Circuit is
searching for a middle ground between Fedorenko and the possibility
of excusing persecutory conduct that results from physical or psychological duress rather than mere convenience..
3.Eighth and Ninth Circuits
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits treat voluntariness as not only
relevant, but also essential to finding a statutory bar to refugee status
under section 101(a)(42). In an early case on the issue, Hernandez v.
Reno, 6 7 the Eighth Circuit remanded Rolando Hernandez's case, finding that the BIA had failed to engage in the "particularized evaluation" of the applicant's conduct required by Fedorenko.68 In its view,
such an evaluation necessarily included "all aspects of Hernandez's
testimony," including his claim that the persecutory acts were invol69
untary.
Hernandez was forcibly recruited into a terrorist group in Guatemala under threat of death and treated as a quasi-prisoner by the
group as they compelled him to take part in their operations. 70 The
court listed several factors it deemed relevant in determining whether
Hernandez's action amounted to assistance or participation in persecution: that his participation in the persecution was "at all times compelled by fear of death"; that he did not "share any persecutory motives" with those who forced him to commit the acts; and that he
escaped from the group as soon as possible. 71 According to the Eighth
Circuit, an analysis of Hernandez's internal mental state was not only
consistent with, but in fact required by, what it calls Fedorenko's "par72
ticularized evaluation" language.

65. Id.
66. Id. ("[N]othing in the record indicates that Xie did not have the ability to quit his job as
a driver at any time in order to avoid the persecution of women that was part of that job. His
reason for not doing so appears to have been the loss of wages he would incur.")
67. 258 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2001).
68. Id. at 813-15.
69. Id. at 815.
70. Id. at 809.
71. Id. at 815.
72. See id. at 813-15 (analyzing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981)).
The BIA has cited Hernandez favorably for the proposition that a court should look at "the totality of the relevant conduct in determining whether the bar to eligibility applies," but not in the
context of voluntariness. In re A-H, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 785 (B.I.A. 2005). The BIA has shown no
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The Ninth Circuit's more recent decision in MirandaAlvarado
v. Gonzales established a still more finely tuned view of the bar to
refugee status due to the persecution of others. 73 According to the
court, there are two requirements to establish culpability of the applicant: personal involvement and purposeful assistance. 74 The second
requirement, purposeful assistance, factors in the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the voluntariness of the applicant's
75
acts.
The MirandaAlvarado court stated that where an applicant alleges that she persecuted others involuntarily, Fedorenko holds only
that this does not absolve her completely of culpability. A less clear
case than Fedorenko requires the court to consider voluntariness as
part of the "particularized evaluation" of each applicant. 76 The court
should include in this analysis factors such as the length of time over
which the action occurred, self-defense or "other extenuating circumstances" motivating the action, and "dire physical consequences" that
may have resulted from refusal to act. 77 After this inquiry, the court
determined that Roberto Ferrer Miranda Alvarado was barred from
refugee status.7 8 However, the court left open the possibility that
"there are, after Fedorenko, some extreme situations so coercive that,
on a totality of circumstances analysis, an individual cannot be said to
have 'assisted or otherwise participated in' persecution he was forced
to inflict." 79 Thus, the Ninth Circuit interprets section 101(a)(42) to allow for a consideration of involuntariness but folds this consideration
into the Fedorenko analysis of whether the action truly amounts to
persecution.
The variety of positions circuit courts have taken on the issue
of involuntary persecution reveals the extent to which this issue is undeparture from its position that voluntariness is never relevant when considering past persecution of others.
73. 449 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006). The difference in the development of the respective circuits' theories can no doubt be attributed to the number of asylum cases each court sees in a
given year, a number which varies widely based upon the number of applicants in that geographic area. In 2006, the Second and Ninth Circuits issued decisions in 1,595 and 848 cases involving "asylum" respectively (as evidenced by a LEXIS search of that term in their published
and unpublished decisions), whereas the Eighth Circuit saw a scant 69 such cases in that year.
LexisNexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com (under "Federal Court Cases, Combined," search "asylum
and COURT (second circuit) and date(geq (1/1/2006) and leq (12/31/2006)").
74. MirandaAlvarado, 449 F.3d at 927.
75. Id. at 928-29.
76. See id. at 927-29 (stating that voluntariness, while important, is not a determinative
factor).
77. Id. at 929.
78. Id. at 933.
79. Id. at 929-30.
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settled. Part IV of this Note analyzes these decisions and finds that no
court offers an ideal interpretation of section 101(a)(42) of the INA.
IV. ANALYSIS

Courts have thus far accepted Fedorenko as precedent in the
INA context but have sought to limit its holding in a variety of ways.
This Part argues that Fedorenko cannot be reconciled with the position that voluntariness may be relevant in cases of past persecution.
This analysis proceeds with three major arguments: (1) the language
of the INA is not sufficiently similar to that of the DPA to assume that
Fedorenko applies to section 101(a)(42); (2) attempting to distinguish
Fedorenko on the grounds that its definition of persecution is outdated
(and thus that affirmative mental intent to persecute should be required) is misguided; and (3) interpreting Fedorenko to allow for the
consideration of voluntariness under the guise of a "particularized
evaluation" is similarly misguided.
A. Key Differences Between the Displaced PersonsAct and the
Immigrationand Nationality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act differs from the Displaced Persons Act such that adopting the Fedorenko holding in the
INA context is unwarranted. The very features of the DPA that the
Supreme Court relied upon in Fedorenko to hold that involuntariness
is irrelevant are absent from the INA. Courts should limit Fedorenko's
application to cases involving the DPA and interpret section 101(a)(42)
of the INA independently.
In interpreting section 101(a)(42) of the INA, the Board of Immigration Appeals in Rodriguez-Majanocited Fedorenko for the premise that "It]he participation or assistance of an alien in persecution
need not be of his own volition to bar him from relief."80 However, this
point of law in Fedorenko was based upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the DPA, not the INA.8 1 The DPA defines "displaced person" by incorporating the definition of "displaced person or refugee"
from the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization of the
United Nations ("IRO Constitution").8 2 Section 2 of the DPA8 3 excludes
80. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 814-15 (B.I.A. 1988).
81. See supratext accompanying notes 36-39.
82. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by
Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219, and Act of June 28, 1951, Pub. L.
No. 82-60, 65 Stat. 96; see Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 495 n.3 (1981) (citing IRO
Constitution, supra note 40, annex I, pt. II, § 2(b)).
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the following persons, among others, from eligibility for refugee or
displaced person status: "Any other persons who can be shown: (a) to
have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries ... or (b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the
outbreak of the second world war in their operations against the
United Nations. '8 4 Notably, section 2(a) requires that the applicant
only have "assisted" in persecution, whereas 2(b) requires that he or
she have "voluntarily assisted" the enemy. Because of this difference
in language, the Supreme Court employed the grammatical canon of
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius.8 5 That is, it presumed that "the deliberate omission of the word 'voluntary' from section 2(a) compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who
assisted in the persecution of civilians [under section 2(a)] ineligible
for visas."8 6 The court explained that "[t]he plain language of the Act
mandates precisely the literal interpretation that ... an individual's
service as a concentration camp armed guard-whether voluntary or
involuntary-made him ineligible for a visa."8 7 Although this interpretation was not unanimous (Justices White and Stevens dissented), 8 it
carried the day.
Modern scholarship has called this interpretation of the DPA
into question. Most recently, Matthew Happold noted that because the
DPA was drafted to conform to the requirements of the IRO Constitution, "arguments from presumed congressional intent do not appear
particularly compelling."8 9 Moreover, Happold pointed to a footnote in
Article 2(b) indicating that the word "voluntarily" was used to exclude
those who might be found to have "assisted" the Nazis by caring for

83. In keeping with the practice of the Supreme Court in Fedorenko, "references to [sections] 2(a) and 2(b), rather than referring to [sections] 2(a) and 2(b) of the DPA, follow the designation of the definitional provisions in the IRO Constitution . . . incorporated in [section] 2(b) of
the DPA." Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 511 n.31.
84. Id. at 495 n.4 (quoting IRO Constitution, supra note 40 (emphasis added)); see Displaced
Persons Act of 1948 § 2(b) (defining "displaced person" as "any displaced person or refugee as defined in Annex I of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization and who is the
concern of the International Refugee Organization").
85. This is translated as "the omission of one implies the exclusion of the other." Id. at 512
(citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974)).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Justice White noted that "one could argue that the words 'assist' and 'persecute' suggest
that § 2 (a) would not apply to an individual whose actions were truly coerced." Id. at 527 n.3
(White, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' view is examined in Section IV.B, infra.
89. Matthew Happold, Excluding Children from Refugee Status: Child Soldiers and Article
1Fof the Refugee Convention, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1131, 1160 (2002).
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the sick and wounded and not to signal different treatment for those
acting freely versus those acting under duress. 90
Nonetheless, barring Supreme Court reversal, the Fedorenko
interpretation of the DPA is binding upon the lower courts. A more
productive way for circuit courts to proceed is to distinguish Fedorenko
so that it applies only in the context of the DPA.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Fedorenko interpretation of the
DPA is correct, the similarity in the language of section 101(a)(42) of
the INA to that of section 2(a) of the DPA does not logically compel an
identical interpretation. Section 101(a)(42) excludes "any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person" from a grant of asylum. 9 1 Beyond the superficial similarity of the word "voluntary's" absence from both sections, the differences are striking. Most importantly, there is no section in the INA
analogous to DPA section 2(b). Without the juxtaposition of a second
section that expressly discusses voluntariness, an interpretation of
section 101(a)(42) that hinges upon the absence of that word loses persuasive value. The canon of construction used in interpreting the DPA
does not apply to section 101(a)(42), and the section must be interpreted on its own. Therefore, it is far from clear that Congress, in
amending the INA in 1980, intended to preclude all consideration of
voluntariness. Nothing in the legislative history indicates such a reading, and the superficial similarity of the INA to the DPA does not justify parroting the Supreme Court without an independent interpreta92
tion.
The Second Circuit, while noting the absence of a nearby section in the INA explicitly mentioning "voluntary conduct," nonetheless
found that "inasmuch as the INA and the DPA were enacted for similar purposes-to enable refugees to find sanctuary in the United
States in the wake of World War II-we find it unlikely that the
phrase 'assisted in persecution' implicitly includes a voluntariness re-

90. Id. at 1161. Other commentators have questioned the continuing relevance of a paradigm for past persecution created upon so singular and unique an event as the Holocaust. See
Lori K. Walls, Comment, The PersecutorBar in U.S. ImmigrationLaw: Toward a More Nuanced
Understandingof Modern "Persecution"in the Case of Forced Abortion and Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 227, 228 (2007) ("The Nazi war criminal/Holocaust victim dichotomy set up a clear-cut-some even argue, simplistic--contrast between persecutor and victim.... [T]he persecutor bar does not map well to the political and cultural realities that give
rise to modern 'persecutors.' ").
91.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).

92. The House Conference Report adopts the House amendment which says only that "specifically excluded from the definition [of refugee] are persons who themselves have engaged in
persecution." H.R. REP. No. 96-781, at 19 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 160.
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quirement in one statute but not the other."93 However, Congress
added the definition of "refugee" to the INA as part of a 1980 amendment to the Act; it was not included in the original version. 94 Although
the broad purpose of the two Acts is similar-to aid refugees-there is
no reason that this similarity should overcome such a stark textual
difference, particularly since it was the one upon which the Supreme
Court entirely based its interpretation of the DPA.
In Bah v. Ashcroft, the Fifth Circuit defended reading the INA
to preclude voluntariness based upon its text alone. 95 The Court reasoned that "Bah participated in persecution, and the persecution occurred because of an individual's political opinions. Had Congress
wanted to base the withholding of removal on the alien's intent, it
could have enacted a statute that withheld removal only of an 'alien
who, because of an individual'spolitical opinion, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution.' "96 The court cited
a Second Circuit decision, Maikovskis v. INS, that held that under the
INA, "the government need not prove that the alien's assistance to the
Nazis in the course of their persecution because of the victims' political opinion was motivated by the same political animus on the part of
the alien." 97 However, this interpretation discounts the fact that the
second sentence of section 101(a)(42), which includes the bar to refugee status for past persecution of others, was clearly written to mirror
the first sentence, which delineates the five accepted grounds for persecution: "persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem98
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's argument more specifically addresses the internal motive of the persecutor, rather than her level of
voluntariness, as addressed above. 99 To conflate the two confuses two
separate notions: on the one hand, that the applicant need not share
the persecutory motive to be guilty of persecution; and on the other,
that voluntariness should be a factor in deciding whether an alien
should be found culpable for past persecutory acts. As addressed in
the following Section, accepting that no persecutory motive is required
93. Zhang Jian Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at
495 (majority opinion)).
94. STEEL, supra note 15, § 8:2.
95. 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. 773 F.2d 435, 446 (2d Cir. 1985).
98. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000) (using this language in both the sentence stating the
bases for persecution that qualify a person as a "refugee" and the sentence excluding from "refugee" status persons who "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in persecution" on
these bases).
99. See supra Section IlI.C.1.
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is not the same as holding that involuntariness is irrelevant in determining whether persecution of others should bar refugee status.

B. Requiring Subjective Mental Intent to Persecute-A Misguided
Attempt to Challenge Fedorenko
Later cases have refined the Supreme Court's dicta defining
the scope of persecution in Fedorenko. Whereas Fedorenko addressed
only an objective element, courts now require an applicant to show
both objective acts amounting to persecution and a subjective motive
on the part of the persecutor. 10 0 However, it would be misguided for a
court to use this difference to challenge a Fedorenko analysis of section
101(a)(42). Such a view would require affirmative mental intent to
persecute before barring an applicant from refugee status for past
wrongful actions. The following section addresses the unintended consequences of such an approach.
1. The Changing Scope of Persecution
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Bah v. Ashcroft to stand for
the proposition that, under INA section 101(a)(42), past persecution of
others bars eligibility for refugee status regardless of whether the persecutor's actions were voluntary. 10 1 As the Fifth Circuit concisely
stated in Bah, "the alien's personal motivation is not relevant."'1 2 This
interpretation of the phrase "assisted or participated in persecution"
considers only the objective effect of the applicant's actions to be relevant (whether they were persecutory), and not her subjective mental
state. This view is derived from the Supreme Court's implicit treat-

100. See supra Section II.B (addressing the modern requirements in proving persecution including the necessity of finding a "nexus" between the acts and the statutorily protected
grounds).
101. Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Aside from Bah,
courts interpreting the relevant INA provisions have used caution in applying Fedorenko'sreading of the similarly-worded DPA to mean that 'an individual's service as a concentration camp
armed guard-whether voluntary or involuntary-makes him ineligible for relief.' " (brackets
omitted)). I disagree with the proposition advanced by the Ninth Circuit in Miranda Alvarado
that the Bah court was addressing voluntariness. See supra Section III.C.1. The case avoids the
question of voluntariness entirely, instead deciding the case based upon Bah's claim that he
lacked intent to persecute. Also noteworthy is that nowhere in Bah did the Fifth Circuit cite Fedorenko. See Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003) (relying instead upon
Maikovskis).
102. Bah, 341 F.3d at 351.
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ment of the word "persecution" in Fedorenko.l0 3 Later Supreme Court
cases, however, are inconsistent with this reading of "persecution." 10 4
In relying only upon Fedorenko, and not upon later cases that have
augmented the requirements of persecution, courts have oversimplified their interpretation of the INA's statutory bar.
In the Fedorenko footnote, the Court limits its reading of the
term "persecution" to objective considerations. 105 The Court states:
[A]n individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were
executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other
hand, there can be no question that a guard... who admitted to shooting at escaping
inmates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits within the statutory language
10 6
about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians.

This footnote establishes a continuum of conduct upon which persecution is defined, but at no point incorporates subjective mental intent.
Instead, only the nature of the action, including its effect on the victim
of persecution, is relevant.
Justice Stevens criticized this narrow understanding of the
term in his Fedorenko dissent, noting that "[t]he Court would give the
word 'persecution' some not yet defined specially limited reading. In
my opinion, the term 'persecution' clearly applies to [cutting the hair
of inmates before execution]; indeed, it probably encompasses almost
every aspect of life or death in a concentration camp." 10 7 Justice Stevens elaborated, stating his belief that harm-producing conduct
"would have to be characterized as assisting in the persecution of
other prisoners. In my view, the reason that such conduct should not
make [the applicants] ineligible ... is that it surely was not voluntary."10 8 Justice Stevens would not allow involuntariness to negate the
persecutory aspect of the acts, but would instead recognize involuntariness as an excuse that mitigates the blameworthiness of the actor.
Since Fedorenko, the Supreme Court has added a subjective
element to its definition of persecution. In INS v. Elias-Zacarias,the
Court held that section 101(a)(42) of the INA "makes motive critical"
in determining whether persecution existed, and that an applicant
"must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial," to proceed
103. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981) (examining "whether particular conduct can be considered assisting in the persecution of civilians" and refusing to examine intent (emphasis added)).
104. See, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992) (placing importance on the victim's subjective reason for fearing persecution).
105. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34 (implementing a line-drawing test based on objective indicia).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 535.
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on a claim of persecution. 10 9 Thus, the Court recognized that the persecutor's subjective mental intent is critical to establishing persecution. The BIA previously recognized this principle, holding that "[a]
finding of persecution requires some degree of intent on the part of the
persecutor to produce the harm that the applicant fears in order that
the persecutor may overcome a belief or characteristic of the applicant."110 Thus, a finding of persecution now entails both a subjective
and an objective requirement.
2. The Consequences of Requiring Motive to Persecute
At first blush, requiring an applicant to prove that her persecutor had a subjective intent to persecute seems inconsistent with denying the persecutor the ability to disprove the act based upon lack on
intent. However, this discrepancy is warranted. Allowing an applicant
to refute evidence of past persecution of others based on her lack of intent would fail to bar those who persecuted others while merely "following orders."
For example, a woman alleging that she was persecuted because of religion must provide some evidence that her persecutors targeted her because of her religion-this is the subjective component of
persecution. However, a court would deem irrelevant that the
woman's same persecutors could prove definitively that they did not
target her because of her religion, but rather because they were following the orders of their commanders. The combination of these notions
seems to produce the absurd result that the person whom an applicant
"persecutes" is not in fact the victim of persecution at the applicant's
hands. This seeming inconsistency is in fact supported by strong policy
objectives.
As another example, consider the case of Rolando Hernandez."' Guatemalan terrorists "recruited" Hernandez by kidnapping
him and sequestering him in a remote guerilla camp. 112 Surrounded
by a group of fifty guerillas and placed under guard to prevent his escape, Hernandez was taken to a village and forced to shoot at civilians.113 The commander of the group stood directly behind him while
Hernandez shot and examined his rifle magazine afterwards to make
109. 502 U.S. at 483.
110. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 815 (B.I.A. 1988) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), modified, In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)).
111. Hernandez v. Reno 258 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2001). Although the Eighth Circuit remanded
Hernandez's case to the BIA, it is very probable that had his case been appealed to the Fifth Circuit instead, the court would have affirmed his denial of refugee status under Bah.
112. Id. at 809.
113. Id.
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sure he had followed orders. 114 Hernandez testified that he tried to
aim away from the villagers and did not think that he hit anyone, but
to shoot
could not be sure because ten other guerillas were11 instructed
5
at the same time, and all the villagers were killed.
Suppose that Hernandez had in fact wounded a villager, and
the villager applied for asylum on account of past persecution. After
16
proving that he was targeted on the grounds of his political opinion,
the villager would have to prove that Hernandez intended to harm
him because of his political beliefs.1 17 Yet, as the story is presented in
the preceding paragraph, the villager could not meet this requirement
by reference to Hernandez, who shot at the villager not because of the
villager's political opinion, but because of his own fear of death. 1 8 To
find persecutory intent, the court would need to look to Hernandez's
commander, who in fact harbored the intent to harm the villager on
account of the villager's political opinion. Thus, Hernandez would be
guilty of persecuting the villager, but the villager would not have been
persecuted by Hernandez.
Such a reading seems to undermine the soundness of excluding
consideration of intent to persecute in Hernandez's case. In other
words, the example above seems to indicate that a court should allow
Hernandez to refute evidence of his past persecution of others by proving lack of motive. However, such a result would instead work greater
injustice. Hernandez's situation seems unjust not because he lacked
the intent to persecute on account of political opinion. Had Hernandez
claimed that he willfully shot the villager, but only because he was indifferent to his politics and liked to shoot at people, we would not be
persuaded that he should be absolved of blame. Instead, Hernandez's
situation seems unfair because he is not allowed to excuse his conduct
on the basis of coercion.
If courts allowed lack of intent to persecute on one of the five
enumerated grounds to defeat the bar to refugee status, courts would
grant asylum to scores of applicants who were "only following orders."
Any person, even one intimately involved in persecution, could claim
that despite the harm her actions caused, she did not engage in "persecution" because she did not harbor the intent to target anyone due
to the person's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The guerilla group told Hernandez that the targeted villagers were "government informants." Id.
117. E.g., In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 815 (B.I.A. 1988) (requiring proof of
intent).
118. See Hernandez, 258 F.3d at 809 (describing reasons for Hernandez's fear of death).
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social group, or political opinion. The problem is that just as much
culpability often lies with those who participate in wrongful acts, even
when they do not share the motive that makes those acts wrong.
The Singh case from the Seventh Circuit is illustrative. 119
Singh claimed that he personally never harmed anyone in his capacity
as a police officer. 120 However, Singh did admit that he brought suspects in to be beaten, observed the beatings, and stood guard while
others were beaten. 21 In his defense, Singh claimed that he personally
did not agree with the persecution imposed by others in the police
force, and that "he refused to quit the police force due to his need for a
steady paycheck and his apparent desire to avoid searching for work
1 22
with a different employer."
Although Singh did not participate in the persecution of Sikhs
because of their religion and thus lacked the requisite "persecutory
motive" to harm them, we have no qualms holding Singh accountable
for these acts. This view is justified by looking at the potential impact
of refusal to participate in the beatings upon Singh's life. According to
his own testimony, had Singh refused to take part in persecution, he
would have been fired. 23 In valuing his own economic comfort above
the physical well-being of the victims, Singh was morally blameworthy
for those actions. However, if refusal to participate in persecution endangered Singh's life, a different issue would be raised, one more like
that presented in Hernandez. Valuing one's own life above the physical well-being of others is something we, as a society, feel less com124
fortable condemning as morally blameworthy.
Insofar as Fedorenko defines persecution only by reference to
the objective effect of the acts on the victim, it is at odds with the
modern definition of persecution. The Court has since made clear that
a subjective component is also necessary to prove persecution. Yet
concluding from this addition that subjective mental intent should
therefore factor into a finding of persecution of others is a misguided
attempt to resolve the dilemma raised by cases such as Hernandez.
Some actors are barred properly by the persecution of others clause in
section 101(a)(42), and reinterpreting that provision to allow them to
gain asylum will cause more injustice overall. The solution outlined in
Part V proposes a method whereby courts can excuse duress, but simultaneously distinguish between situations presented by applicants
119. Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 737.
121. Id.

122. Id. at 740.
123. See id. at 737 ("[H]e elected to continue working for the police for financial reasons.").
124. See infra Section V.A (discussing the duress excuse).
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like Hernandez and those presented by applicants like Singh. But
first, the following Section will analyze a similarly misguided attempt
to reconcile Fedorenko with a consideration of voluntariness.
Evaluations"C. ConsideringVoluntariness through "Particularized
A Similarly Misguided Attempt to Interpret Fedorenko
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits interpreted Fedorenko's language on "particularized evaluations" 125 to require an analysis of voluntariness when presented with a "line-drawing problem." This Section argues that bringing in considerations of duress by appealing to
the necessity of conducting "particularized evaluations" is a textually
unsound reading of Fedorenko that has disturbing implications for the
victims of persecution.
In Hernandez, the Eighth Circuit refused to accept a literal interpretation of Fedorenko that would bar Hernandez from refugee
status due to his past persecutory acts. The court remanded the case
to the BIA, requiring that it "consider Hernandez's uncontroverted
testimony that his involvement with [the guerilla group] was at all
times involuntary and compelled by threats of death and that he
shared no persecutory motives with the guerrillas." 126 Although the
court accepted Fedorenko as precedent, it determined that dissimilarities between the situations faced by Fedorenko and Hernandez created a line-drawing problem under Fedorenko. 27 The court remanded
for what it called a "full Fedorenko analysis," which it read to require
a "particularized evaluation in order to determine whether an individual's behavior was culpable to such a degree that he could be fairly
deemed to have assisted or participated in persecution."1 28 The court
thus read Fedorenko to require an assessment of voluntariness in cir-

125. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981). The decision does not use the
phrase "particularized evaluation" but that term is derived from the following passage: "The solution to the problem perceived by the District Court. . . lies, not in 'interpreting' the Act to include a voluntariness requirement that the statute itself does not impose, but in focusing on
whether particularconduct can be considered assisting in the persecution of civilians." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
126. Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 813-14. The dissimilarities relied upon by the Eighth Circuit included that Fedorenko never tried to escape and Hernandez did repeatedly; that Hernandez received no payment from the guerillas whereas Fedorenko did from the Nazis; that Fedorenko served for over a
year as opposed to Hernandez's twenty days; that Fedorenko and the other guards far outnumbered the Germans, whereas Hernandez and two others were isolated amongst fifty guerillas;
and finally that Hernandez revealed his involvement with the guerillas to the authorities,
whereas Fedorenko concealed his past actions. Id. at 814.
128. Id. at 813, 815.
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cumstances where persecution is not as clear-cut as it was in the case
of Fedorenko himself.
The Ninth Circuit in Miranda Alvarado similarly indicated
that a court should consider voluntariness as part of a "particularized
evaluation" of conduct under Fedorenko. 29 The court read Fedorenko
to stand for the proposition that "the kinds of threats used to compel
[the] assistance" of the persecutor were relevant in determining culpability. The court noted, "[a]side from Bah, courts interpreting the
relevant INA provisions have used caution in applying Fedorenko's
reading" barring voluntariness. To support this point, the court cited
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hernandez and the Second Circuit's
decision in Xie, noting that even though Xie rejected a "voluntariness
requirement," it "assess[ed] the petitioner's voluntariness nonetheless." 130 Thus, the Ninth Circuit accepted Fedorenko as precedent in
the INA context, but interpreted the case to require assessment of
voluntariness as part of a particularized evaluation of the applicant's
conduct, much as the Eighth Circuit did in Hernandez.
This effort by courts to surreptitiously give weight to voluntariness by way of a "particularized" evaluation of the applicant's conduct is misguided. Fedorenko is clear on this point: the "plain language" of the DPA "mandates... the literal interpretation that.., an
individual's service as a concentration camp armed guard-whether
voluntary or involuntary-made him ineligible" to seek refuge in the
United States. 131 The court explicitly precluded considerations of involuntariness not just in the case of Fedorenko himself, but in every
case arising under the DPA, stating that interpreting the Act to include a "voluntariness requirement" was improper. 132 Particularized
evaluations of conduct were noted as the proper way to distinguish
cases, as opposed to distinguishing them based on whether the action
was voluntary: "[t]he solution ... lies, not in 'interpreting' the Act to
include a voluntariness requirement that the statute itself does not
impose, but in focusing on whether particular conduct can be considered assisting in the persecution of civilians." 133 The Supreme Court
thus instructed lower courts to disregard voluntariness and instead
determine whether the actions taken by the applicant were properly
labeled as "persecution." And, as noted above, at the time Fedorenko
was decided, such an assessment focused solely upon the objective effects of the actions, precluding consideration of the subjective compo129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (emphasis added).
Id. at 512 n.34.
Id.
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nent of persecution. 13 4 Thus, a court cannot attempt both to accept Fedorenko as precedent in the INA context and to allow involuntariness
to weigh against a finding of past persecution of others.
Reading Fedorenko to allow a court to consider voluntariness
as part of an applicant's particular situation has disturbing implications. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits' position implies that circumstances may exist under which the actions taken by an applicant were
involuntary, and thus that she did not engage in persecution as defined by section 101(a)(42). Such a position confuses involuntariness
with the lack of affirmative mental intent to persecute, as the Hernandez court appeared to do when it considered relevant the fact that
Hernandez "shared no persecutory motives with the guerrillas." 13 5 As
noted above, this line of reasoning risks watering down the INA bar to
refugee status to allow those who were merely following orders, like
36
Singh, to claim a lack of motive.
Alternately, such a position minimizes the severe harm experienced by the victim of the acts in question. Under a sound reading of
Fedorenko, allowing voluntariness to negate a finding that an applicant committed "persecution" denigrates her victims. A court would
have to hold that, under a particularized evaluation of the circumstances, Rolando Hernandez did not "persecute" the unarmed villagers
when he participated in lining them up and shooting at them. 3 7 Such
a position is morally repugnant in unfairly and unnecessarily diminishing the pain suffered by his victims.
The "particularized evaluation" rationale is appealing in that it
sets no firm rules that bind a judge's hands in determining whether to
grant an applicant asylum. Yet failing to delineate a generally applicable rule, and instead granting a court wide discretion to consider
each applicant's story, can result in uneven application of the law.
Crafting a rule in which coerced action is evaluated the same way
every time and acts as an excuse in certain predetermined circumstances increases predictability and ultimately the legitimacy of the
entire asylum system.
The current interpretation of section 101(a)(42) of the INA accepts Fedorenko as precedent, but in certain cases attempts to interpret the case to allow for consideration of voluntariness of action. Such
an approach is flawed, not only in accepting Fedorenko as precedent
for the INA, but also in failing to put forth a generally applicable rule
134. See supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the holding in Fedorenko, which limits analysis of
"persecution" to objective considerations).
135. Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2001).
136. See supra Section V.B.
137. See Hernandez, 258 F.3d at 815.
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concerning actions committed under coercion. Fedorenko must be limited to the context of the DPA if involuntariness of action is ever to be
deemed relevant to a finding of past persecution of others.
V. SOLUTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Fedorenko is irreconcilable
with recognizing an exception for duress in instances of past persecution of others. As a result, circuit courts should limit that case's holding to the context of the Displaced Persons Act and interpret section
101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act independently. The
marked dissimilarities between the provisions of the two Acts addressing persecution of others make such an interpretation not merely colorable, but the superior and more textually honest reading of the
8
INA.13
Although voluntariness of action is not mentioned explicitly in
the text of section 101(a)(42), the statute can be read to include an implicit requirement that any actions taken were of the applicant's own
free will.13 9 This interpretation would recognize that the actions taken
by the applicant constitute persecution. It would allow courts to weigh
involuntariness in the way Justice Stevens urged in his Fedorenko
dissent: not to preclude a finding that the actions were persecutory,
140
but rather to excuse its blameworthiness.
In constructing a duress exception, courts should avoid language implying the requirement of an affirmative mental intent to
persecute on the part of an applicant who assisted or participated in
persecution. Otherwise, only those who directed the action and formulated the plans for persecution would consistently be held accountable. 141 Persecution on a vast scale often requires the assistance and
participation of thousands who may not share the same motives as
their leaders but are willing to take orders blindly. 142 Moreover, the
138. See supra Section IV.A (describing key differences between the two Acts that make application of Fedorenko to INA context flawed).
139. In fact, the Supreme Court has read an implicit duress defense into statutes previously.
See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415-16 (1980) (recognizing an implicit defense of
duress in a statute criminalizing escape from federal custody).
140. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 534-95 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. See supra Section IV.B.2 (examining the effect of requiring a finding of motive to persecute).
142. Nowhere, perhaps, is this clearer than in the case of the Holocaust, where the world has
come to realize that it was not just the Nazi officials at the highest levels who are culpable for
this tragedy, but the millions of who "remain[ed] silent, apathetic, and indifferent in the face of
others' oppression." U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, TEACHING ABOUT THE HOLOCAUST: A
RESOURCE BOOK FOR EDUCATORS 2 (2001), available at http://www.holocaust-trc.org/

uhmmmguides.htm.
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INA's language precludes an interpretation that would limit barring
only those who are most culpable, for section 101(a)(42) mentions not
only those who "ordered" and "incited" persecution, but those who "assisted" and "participated" as well.1 43 The following Section proposes a
narrow scope for an implied excuse for duress that carefully balances
these considerations.
A. Proposal:A Limited Duress Excuse in Response to Credible Threats
of Imminent Death or Severe Bodily Harm to Oneself or Another
An applicant for asylum should not be barred automatically
from meeting the definition of a "refugee" in the INA because she participated in past persecution of others. Courts should excuse persecutory acts that would otherwise bar an applicant from seeking asylum
when the applicant acted in response to credible threats of imminent
death or severe bodily harm to oneself or another.
The proposed duress exception is limited in scope such that
only the most compelling circumstances warrant excusing past persecution. To be excused, persecutory acts must be (1) in response to
credible threats (2) of imminent death or severe bodily injury (3) to
oneself or another. To satisfy the test, an applicant would have to allege more than mere disagreement with the underlying intent of the
other persecutors. She would have to prove that she was threatened,
explicitly or implicitly, with either death or severe harm. Requiring
that the threats be credible, both objectively and subjectively, ensures
that the exception will apply only in cases of extreme physical or psychological coercion.
Taking the example presented by Hernandez v. Reno, the
threats made to Hernandez would meet this requirement of credibility. 144 After kidnapping him and taking him to a secluded guerilla
camp, the commander of the guerillas gave Hernandez a gun, ordered
him to shoot at villagers, stood directly behind him while he shot, and
then examined his weapon "to check whether he had followed orders." 14 5 Although there is no record of an explicit threat that Hernandez would be killed if he did not follow orders, the circumstances of the
situation contained an implied threat, and Hernandez testified that he
"understood he would be killed if he did not follow the commander's
order." 146 The setting, as well as the fact that he had been abducted,
supports the credibility of the threat.
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
144. 258 F.3d 806, 815 (8th Cir. 2001).
145. Id. at 809.

146. Id.
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In addition to being credible, a threat must concern imminent
death or severe bodily harm to justify participation or assistance in
persecution. Assisting in persecution to avoid economic harm or inconvenience, or merely to fit in, would not fall within the proposed scope
of the exception. Hernandez again offers a useful example. Hernandez
testified that he was told that he would be killed if he failed to obey
147
orders, a threat that clearly meets the required severity of the test.
Moreover, the threats involved imminent death. Even though threats
of death or harm in the distant future may trigger similar psychological responses to more immediate threats, they warrant a different response due to the time the threatened person has to respond to the
situation. If a threat is not imminent, it seems more reasonable to expect an actor to assess the situation rationally and find an alternative
course of action.
The facts underlying the Seventh Circuit's decision in Singh offer another perspective.' 48 Singh testified at his hearing that he continued in his employment as a police officer, in which he participated
in the persecution of Sikhs, only because of "his need for a steady paycheck and his apparent desire to avoid searching for work with a different employer."'1 49 Though the threat of being fired was perhaps
credible, the consequences of the threat involve only economic harm,
which fails to raise the moral dilemma Singh faced to a level at which
it is defensible to excuse his actions.
Finally, the threats may be made against either the actor or
another person. Acting to save another from death or imminent harm,
especially when that other is a close friend or relative, often presents a
more compelling motivation to act, even when that act causes harm to
others. A credible threat of imminent death or severe harm psychologically pressures the victim to accede to the demands to persecute.
Even those who might withstand this pressure when applied solely to
themselves may be overwhelmed when the threatened harm would befall another.
This proposed rule is adapted from two sources: the definitions
of duress advanced by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees ("UNHCR") and the Model Penal Code. The UNHCR imposes
"stringent conditions" upon a person alleging a defense of duress, requiring not just "a threat of imminent death or... serious bodily harm
against that person or another person" but also avoidance of the
threat if possible and intent not "to cause a greater harm than the one
147. Id.
148. Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2005).
149. Id. at 740.
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sought to be avoided." 150 The Model Penal Code recognizes duress as
an excuse when a person is "coerced to [commit the wrongful act] by
the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the
person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist."151 Both definitions encompass
threats of grave harm and recognize that the threat may be against
either the victim of duress or another person.
A duress excuse in the asylum context is built upon the foundation provided by the affirmative defense of duress in criminal law, under which an actor claims that the pressure imposed on her by another
makes her more a victim than a willing participant in the actions. Duress "deflects responsibility for a coerced wrongful act from the perpetrator onto the person who coerced it, and so amounts to a claim that
fear rendered the perpetrator blameless or undeterrable."1 52 A person
is held blameless as a result of duress because it is assumed that any
other person "of reasonable firmness" in her position would not have
been able to resist and act differently.1 53 The notion of undeterrability
underlies the utilitarian rationale behind duress, which recognizes
that the threat of criminal punishment that normally deters a person
from committing wrongful acts will be of no effect when she is co154
erced.
The Second Circuit, in Xie, suggested similar parameters for a
duress excuse when it noted that at no time did Xie, whose job it was
to drive women to doctors for forced abortion procedures, allege "that
he was physically or psychologically coerced.. . [nor that] he could not
have obtained alternate employment."1 55 The court cited these three
grounds as possible arguments Xie could have raised in claiming involuntariness, implying that it may be amenable to recognizing duress

150. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
69, U.N. Doc.
HCRIGIP/03/05 (Sep. 4, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.orglcgi.bin/texislvtx/home/ opendoc.pdftbl=RSDLEGAL&id=3f5857d24. Such a definition tracks the position of the Supreme
Court in Bailey, which stated that "[u]nder any definition of [duress] one principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to
do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm, the defenses will fail." United States
v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 411 (1980) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In an asylum case,
such facts would influence the court's decision as part of an evaluation of all the circumstances
surrounding the case.
151. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962).
152. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 560.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1).
154. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 300 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing

that, when coerced, the threat of criminal punishment is ineffective).
155. Zhang Jian Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2006).
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in future cases involving physical coercion, psychological coercion, or
severe economic harm.156
B. Potential Criticism and Response
Two major criticisms can be leveled at the proposal that duress
should be recognized in limited circumstances as an excuse for past
persecution of others. First, one could argue that although duress
might excuse certain actions, the most severe and damaging actssuch as murder-should fall outside the recognized scope of the defense per se. Second, one could argue that duress is not compatible
with asylum law because, unlike criminal law, which has a legal basis,
asylum has a moral underpinning, and thus legalistic excuses such as
duress lose their force when applied to it.
Critics might argue that duress should excuse only so much,
and that the most morally reprehensible acts, such as murder or torture, should never be excused on grounds of coercion. Many states recognize duress as an affirmative criminal defense but will not allow it
to excuse murder. 157 Other states "permit a defense of 'imperfect duress,' lowering murder to manslaughter, and a few others excuse accomplices in felony murders, but not intentional killings. ' 158 It could
be argued that if courts recognize duress in the context of asylum,
they similarly should allow it to excuse only some acts (i.e., not the
killing of another person). Put another way, this view claims that a
person told to kill or suffer death has a duty to choose death and not to
value her life more highly than that of another.
This question has been debated for centuries, 159 and this Note
will not attempt to provide a full justification for the view that duress
should excuse killing another. The duress excuse contemplated by the
Model Penal Code makes no distinction between different types of
criminal acts.1 60 Moreover, the Code commentators have noted that
"even homicide may sometimes be the product of coercion that is truly
156. This Note, however, declines to recognize threats of economic harm or retaliation, no
matter how severe they may be, as appropriate grounds for a claim of duress. This position
tracks that of the MPC and most courts in "requir[ing] at least a threat to personal safety, not to
property, as a minimum requirement for the duress defense." KAPLAN ET. AL., supra note 5, at
567. Although severe economic harm may lead to physical harm in some instances-for example,
Xie losing his job and being unable to find another may lead him to starve-such a link is attenuated enough that it fails to carry the force of direct physical or psychological pressure.
157. Id. at 571.
158. Id.
159. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress:Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for its ProperLimits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1370-74 (1989) (surveying centuries of scholarship
debating whether duress can excuse coerced homicides).
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962).
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irresistible." 16 1 As Joshua Dressler has noted, "[i]f a person of reasonable moral strength might comply with a kill-or-be-killed threat (or,
perhaps more compellingly, a kill-or-I-will-kill-a-loved-one threat), the
case for denying the defense, as a matter of law, is weakened considerably."' 62 This line of reasoning indicates that courts should hold
those alleging duress to a standard based upon comparison to an average person and not require that those misfortunate enough to be
placed in such a situation act like heroes.
The argument against excusing coerced killing is even weaker
in a situation like the Hernandez case, where it is clear that the villagers targeted by the guerillas coercing Hernandez would have died
no matter what Hernandez chose to do.' 6 3 Had Hernandez refused to
shoot, the guerillas would have killed him in addition to, not instead
of, the villagers. In such a situation, the only outcome Hernandez
could control was whether he himself lived or died; his refusal to shoot
at the villagers would have made him perhaps heroic and morally
praiseworthy, but dead nonetheless.
A second potential criticism of the proposed solution challenges
a duress excuse in the particular context of asylum law. The argument
is usually similar to the following: "[D]uress is a legal excuse, not a
moral justification and 'asylee' is a moral, not legal, status. Denial of
asylum to an applicant who has, under duress, participated in the persecution of others, is acceptable because it is a function of moral culpability, not legal liability."1 64 An applicant for asylum is petitioning
this country for a positive legal benefit, not seeking to avoid imprisonment for past acts under criminal law.
Yet this distinction weighs unfairly upon asylum applicants
and is more useful in theory than in practice. To require an applicant
to reach a standard of behavior that society does not impose upon its
own citizens is unjustifiable. The basis of asylum law is not to reward
outstanding applicants for their strength of character, but to recognize
that in some circumstances the suffering an applicant has faced in her
165
own country is so extreme that she may seek refuge in this country.
Asylum is not meant to reward the exceptional, but rather to recognize the misery and persecution endured by many. To deny someone
161. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 376 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
162. DRESSLER, supra note 154, at 305.
163. See Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that ten other guerillas in addition to Hernandez were ordered to open fire on the villagers).
164. David Gray, An Excuse-CenteredApproach to TransitionalJustice, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2621, 2658 (2006).
165. ANKER, supra note 7, at 4.
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this benefit because she was placed in a morally difficult situation and
chose what society considers to be the "wrong" outcome in saving her
own life (or, in an even more compelling case, saving the life of a family member) is unjust. 166
From a utilitarian point of view, the consequences to the criminal defendant and the asylum seeker are "on equal footing," with the
asylee facing what may be an even more desperate situation. 67 Applicants who are denied asylum are forcibly deported to the countries in
which they suffered persecution and where they may face a lifetime of
additional persecution, torture, or even death. 168 So long as this country recognizes a criminal defense of duress, there is no coherent reason
why such a defense should not be recognized in asylum law as well.' 69
Accepting that asylum law is based in morality, and that "[miorally, a
refusal [to harm others] might be laudable," the reason for this is that
"it goes beyond what might reasonably be expected of a person.' 170 The
average person may well accede to pressure. Assuming that the applicant has done nothing to place herself in danger of duress, then it is a
matter of chance that she has been the one subjected to this moral
quagmire; often, "[p]ersons who have committed crimes under duress
are more unfortunate than undeserving."'17' Holding asylum applicants who have the misfortune to have been targeted and coerced into
persecutory action to some higher "moral" standard than this country
demands of its own citizens is both hypocritical and unjust.
Recognizing an exception to duress in the limited circumstances outlined above will not weaken this country's legal or moral
standards, nor will it result in a torrent of asylum applicants. In the
very few cases in which an applicant will satisfy the stringent requirements of the duress exception, such an excuse would allow courts

166. See Jennie Pasquarella, Victims of Terror Stopped at the Gate to Safety: The Impact of
the "MaterialSupport to Terrorism"Bar on Refugees, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 28, 31 (2006) (arguing
that the lack of a duress defense in asylum law produces an "absurd result" in punishing the victims of terrorism along with "terrorists themselves or those who intentionally and voluntarily
support terrorism"); see also Amy Frey, Comment, The Case for Burma: Inconsistent U.S. Policies, Unjust Application of U.S. Law, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 207, 229 (2006) ("[The coerced]
individual is most likely ideologically opposed to the group (otherwise, duress would not have
been necessary in the first place) and is now traumatized by the entire experience. The United
States should not ignore the plight of these victims, and exacerbate their trauma .... ").
167. Gregory A. Laufer, Note, Admission Denied: In Support Of a Duress Exception to the
Immigration and Nationality Act's "MaterialSupport for Terrorism" Provision, 20 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 437, 455 (2006).
168. Id.
169. Happold, supra note 88, at 1163.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id.
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to exercise leniency toward those who acted under the type of coercion
that most would find overwhelming.
VI. CONCLUSION

Courts have struggled to apply the bar to refugee status based
on past persecution of others under section 101(a)(42) of the INA when
applicants have claimed that they acted involuntarily. Federal courts
have for years unquestioningly applied the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Displaced Persons Act in Fedorenko v. United States to
the context of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but this reading of
the INA is unsound. Instead, Fedorenko should be limited to the context of the DPA, and courts should interpret the INA to include an implied excuse for actions committed under duress when individuals
persecuted others in response to credible threats of imminent death or
severe bodily harm to oneself or another. Such a limited definition
would excuse those few victims of overwhelming coercion that petition
this country for aid and deserve a second chance.
Nicole Lerescu

J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University, May 2008. I would like to thank my parents,
Dory Velten-Lerescu and Nick Lerescu, for their constant support and encouragement. I would
also like to thank Judge Chester J. Straub for giving me the opportunity to discover asylum law.
Finally, I would like to thank the many members of the Law Review whose work made the publication of this Note possible.

